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Altruism and Professionalism:
Boston and the Rise of
Organized Legal Aid, 1900-1925
Part II
by Michael Grossberg

The Boston Legal Aid Society was founded in
1900. In the years after 1910, led by General
Counsel Reginald Heber Smith, the Society assuned leadership of the fledging movement to
offer legal services to the urban poor. Under its
influence the first organized attack on the legal
problems of the impoverished was launched. The
effort had its origins in the social and professional crises that beset turn of the century American cities and lawyers. As described in the first
installnent of this article, the major difficulty
facing the movement during this generative era
was how to balance the conflicting demands of
legal aid's two major constituencies, the bar and
the poor. Three facets of the Society's work reveal how it resolved this problem: its relationship with the local bar, its creation of a distinctive type of legal representation, and its campaign for legal reforms.
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Michael Grossberg is a doctoral candidate in
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Uncertain Support
The relationship between legal aid and the
organized bar was a crucial element in the movement's formative period. Under Smith's leadership legal aid lawyers sought a place for themselves in the newly emerging professional
structure. Proponents of legal assistance for the
poor shared the bar's determination to repair its
social standing without forfeiting its pivotal social role. Legal aid was both a direct product and
a significant contribution to this attempt to reconstruct the bar into a body of modern, competent but independent public servants, trusted by
the society to adapt the law to its new surroundings. As a self-proclaimed "Lawyer's Legal Aid
Society," the Boston organization readily accommodated itself to the needs of the organized bar.'
Securing professional acceptance for legal aid
was not a simple proposition. The reaction to
Justice and the Poor revealed the depth of opposition to any movement that criticized the legal
system. The volume, which received wide press
and professional coverage, exposed the cleavage
within the bar between reformers and what Alfred Z. Reed of the Carnegie Foundation called
"obscurantist
ostriches." 2
Most
strikingly,
Smith's opponents did not devalue legal aid per
se, but rather refused to acknowledge his claim
that it was necessary because of defects in the
legal system. Instead, they saw it mainly as a social palliative. The reaction of New York corporate lawyer William Guthrie, who was a member
of the New York Legal Aid Society, was typical.
He fumed that "Taken in all, the pamphlet will,
I apprehend, do more harm than good in tending
to create an entirely erroneous impression as to
the administration of justice in this country, in so
far as it relates to the poor."" Even the New
York Times denounced Smith.'

The stridency of this reaction compelled Smith
and the Carnegie Foundation to respond. Smith
repeatedly defended his study as a determined effort to strengthen popular respect for the law.
Reed, who later antagonized the bar with his
study of the legal profession, also came to
Smith's defense. He dismissed those like Guthrie
who saw any public acknowledgement of failings
in the legal structure as a betrayal of upper class
solidarity, and argued that more moderate critics
of Justice and the Poor did themselves a disservice by failing to heed Smith's reform call. "They
and their organizations," he contended, "are on
trial before the public. If they do not get in line
with public opinion, particularly of the younger
generation, who will soon assume control, I have
no fear of actual 'Bolshevism,' but radical legislation may be pushed too far, if the conservative
element allows itself to become discredited. In
any case, they and their organizations will have
lost their opportunity to participate, in an influential way in changes favored by public opinion." Legal aid overcame this opposition because
it demonstrated that assisting the poor also aided
the profession.
Legal aid societies like Boston's exhibited their
usefulness to the bar, first of all, by relieving its
ethical responsibility to serve the poor. As the
Boston Bar Association explained to its members,
"the simplest and most economical arrangement
is for us to support the Legal Aid Society which
is organized for this purpose and which, through
experience has become efficient in caring for the
problems presented by the poor.""1 Through legal
aid the bar promoted the "general welfare of the
community by giving legal services to people too
poor to pay for them and at the same time relieved
the office of the average attorney from an influx
of unprofitable business, which must either be
neglected or consume the valuable time of busy
men." 7 And, as Martin Mayer suggests, "psychologically the legal aid bureaus relieved lawyers of
their guilt at failing to live up to their codes."'
The rise of organized legal aid in cities like
Boston thus allowed the legal profession to deflect persistent criticism of its failure to meet its
social responsibilities. Thanks to legal aid, the
bar could insist that its self-imposed duties to the
poor were being met and at the same time reinforce the public image of the lawyer as a minister
of justice and the law as "a profession not a
business."' These claims were enhanced by the
constant assertion of legal aid advocates like
Smith that their service was necessary because of
social change, not professional indifference. Legal

aid fulfilled this ethical duty by informally
bureaucratizing it. No longer was servirg the
poor a responsibility of every attorney. Instead a
separate agency, the legal aid society, assumed
the burden.1"
Legal aid also assisted in the organized bar's
professionalizing efforts by policing urban practitioners. Bar associations dismissed contentions
that the bar was socially distrusted because of its
growing commercial ties. The real culprits, they
claimed, were to be found mainly in the profession's lower reaches, preying on the unprotected
poor and immigrant classes. These were the unethical shysters, ambulance chasers, and other
"wolves in sheep's clothing who are capable of
the basest sort of treachery to their clients."'"
Those practitioners were accused of a double offense: afflicting the poor and undermining the
profession. Legal aid societies could directly attack this problem because they dealt with "a
class of attorneys who are unknown to the leaders of the bar, and they negotiate with them,
try cases against them, and come into contact with
them in daily practice, so they are in a position 1to2
detect

improper

and

unlawful

conduct." '

Through its offer of inexpensive legal services,
legal aid not only ferreted these out but offered
itself as substitute.
The Boston Society's early commitment to this
task surfaced in its acceptance of personal injury
cases and claims against lawyers. Several legal
aid organizations refused personal injury cases,
contending that representation was available
to all litigants through the contingent fee system, in which a lawyer either divided awards
with his client or received nothing if the case
was lost." But Boston's legal aid lawyers argued
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that it was "well known that the poor plaintiffs
by falling into the hands of unscrupulous practitioners often obtain but a small share of their
verdict; the lawyer, doctor, and 'runner' dividing
most between themselves." '' Most of the lawyers
accepting contingent fees, they asserted, were the
very practitioners fouling the bar's image. Legal
aid should challenge, not cooperate with them.
Claims against lawyers were accepted on the
same grounds." While the Society scrupulously
avoided competing with most fellow practitioners,
it eagerly vied with those labeled by the professional associations as disreputable.
By uniting professionalization with representation, legal aid lawyers visualized themselves
as the poor's guardians and the bar's "watchdog."'" Societies like Boston's saw themselves
as in "an impartial position" with "no private
interests at stake . . . Just as they have served

to extend the administration of justice into the
great field at the bottom of society, so they have
extended the watchfulness and discipline of the
bar association."'" This was legal aid's contribution to the goal of an integrated, unitary profession, whose members had similar training,
ethics, and practices.' Legal aid thus allowed
for client differentiation without sacrificing these
objectives. The Boston Society formalized this
role by becoming the official investigative arm
of the Boston Bar Association. In that way it
threw its cloak of impartiality and neutrality over
the profession's attempts to dispel unwanted
practitioners.'"
Perhaps the most significant services of legal
aid to the organized bar was the firm resolve of
its leaders to protect the profession's independence. After reading Justice and the Poor, Henry
Taft, a prominent New York lawyer and brother
of the former President, protested that legal aid
was either "a philanthropic undertaking by patriotic citizens at private expense for the benefit
of the poor litigant and thus is in the nature of
a charity; or it is a proper subject to be part of
the machinery of the administration of justice."2'
Smith and his colleagues disagreed. Legal aid
was neither charity nor government aid, but
rather a voluntary service of independent professionals.
There were three types of legal aid organizations during the movement's founding era: independent voluntary societies, divisions of charities, and municipal agencies. Private associations
like Boston's led the movement. They were the
most prevalent type of organization, and their
members held positions of authority in the moveJUNE, 1978

ment. While never calling for the elimination of
the other forms, lawyers from the private societies opposed their diffusion. 1
They argued that viewing legal aid solely as a
philanthropy undermined the basic right of the
poor to counsel and threatened to equate justice
with charity.22" Their most strident opposition,
23
though, was directed at the public agencies.
Despite the almost complete agreement within
the movement that legal aid would eventually
become a public responsibility, the private societies resisted immediate municipal assumption
of their duties. They claimed that public control
would subvert the proper functioning of legal
aid because of the danger of inefficiency and
bureaucratization, the pericious influence of corrupt urban politics, and the loss of professional
independence. Public control was put off to
maintain the legal aid lawyers' politically independent position as neutral legal experts. The
private societies cited this political independence
as one of their main attributes. Behind this opposition was the fear that legal aid could be used
wedge for state control of the
as the opening
2
profession . "

Legal aid lawyers' opposition to public control also reflected a fear of urban politics shared
with other "good government" reformers of the
period. Like the backers of civil service, city
managers, and city commissions, they wanted to
take politics out of urban affairs and replace 2it
with rational efficient, businesslike practices.. 1
But unlike the other reformers they refused to
sanction efforts to include legal aid as one of the
components of restructured urban governance.
Instead they would entrust the public with legal
aid only when its officials met their criteria. The
stunted development of municipal legal aid
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through most of the twentieth century testifies
to the effectiveness of the movement's determination to keep legal services a professional
not
a public - responsibility.
Despite these contributions, legal aid had an
uncertain status in the legal hierarchy. It sparked
the active interest only of a small portion of the
profession. While the bench and bar applauded
the efforts of legal aid societies, few contributed
more than their voices. In Boston, even with the
Society's illustrious origins and composition,
members of the bar contributed only 31% of its
financial support. Laymen actually kept legal
aid alive.'
The commitment of legal aid lawyers themselves was strained by the conditions of legal
aid work. It was less intellectually demanding,
less professionally rewarding, and much less remunerative than private practice. A chief attorney in the New York Society described its
tasks as "deadening, routine work, which would
kill any sensible, ambitious man in two
months.""7 Roscoe Pound echoed this complaint
in his evaluation of student legal aid. In a letter
to Dean Harlan Stone of Columbia Law School
he concluded, "I have observed this legal aid
business here pretty carefully, and am still firmly
of the opinion that giving advice to and prosecuting petty cases for the type of person who applies to a legal aid society is no legitimate part of
the training of the sort of men to whom we appeal
and whom we seek to turn out." ' - In spite of
this, legal aid enmeshed itself in the profession
because it was a hopeful creation for those who
believed that the legal difficulties of the poor
and the deficiencies of the bar were manifestations of the same problem.""
Legal aid became the poverty arm of the organized bar. It looked to bar associations for
funds, leadership, and professional support.
Smith and his colleagues had considered legal
aid an "orphan" without any "suitable guardian"
until 1921, when the A.B.A. formed a legal aid
committee to oversee the movement."o It was
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then officially merged into the general drive of
the legal profession to uplift the administration
and practices of the law. Its own mission was
readily subsumed into those professional goals.
The legal problems of the poor were determined
to be solely a craft responsibility, which was
readily delegated to the Boston Society and others
like it around the nation. This desire to gain and
maintain professional recognition set limits on
the ability of legal aid to serve its impoverished
clientele. It was a critical factor in determining
the form of services that the Society dispensed.

Federal

Special Services
While trying to assure itself a place within
the legal system, legal aid also had to devise a
method of rendering legal services to the poor.
The Boston Society's operations were representative of the private organizations that led the
movement. The Society's model of legal services
was the new corporate law firm, which in turn was
patterned after the efficient, rational business
corporation. This choice reflected Smith's conviction that "the organization of the best private
offices represents the best experience of the bar
as to the method best suited to the conduct of a
law office. So legal aid should be conducted in
the same manner."'" The only difference was to
be the presence of many more clients and the
fact that no bills were sent out. All else was to
resemble a normal law firm: ethical responsibilities, legal tactics, regard for the client's interest,
and the like. By coming to the "Poor Man's
Lawyer," as the Society began calling itself, the
applicant was to receive the same services as his
wealthier
neighbors obtained at their own law
2
firms.3

But this model was never fully implemented.
In Boston and every other city the press of poor
applicants and the professional and ideological
commitments of the legal aid movement combined to divert legal aid away from its preferred
approach. Though the ideal remained, the move-
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ment was compelled to formulate a much broader
conception of legal services. This in turn led to
recurrent tensions within the movement over the
boundaries of its duties. The approach developed
in Boston illustrates both the extent and the
limits of the complex relationship established
between legal aid and its impoverished clientele.
The most obvious features that distinguished
the Society from other law offices were precarious finances and tremendous workloads. As a
private, voluntary association the Society was almost totally dependent on contributions. Its impoverished clientele, by definition, could ill afford to finance its operations. Yet the size of its
staff, the location of its office, and its other resources were determined by this uncertain monetary base. As a result, legal aid had to advertise,
plead, and cajole alongside other agencies clamoring for the pocketbooks of philanthropic Bostonians. This dependency obviously limited the Society's effectiveness. And inevitably, there was a
reluctance to press claims against prominent
Boston businesses who were or might be induced
to financially support legal aid as well as a tendency to limit publicity about the Society in order
to diminish the workload."'
Allied with such difficulties was the deadening
workload itself. During its first twenty-five years
the Society's caseload rose annually. In this time
span it handled approximately 70,000 cases with
a legal staff that varied from four to seven
lawyers per year. " With so many clients trooping through its doors there was little time for
the intimate client contact available in the offices
of their professional colleagues. Quick solutions
and rapid turnover became the Society's hallmark.
The legal complaints presented to the Society
fell into four distinct categories. They show that
the poor found themselves enmeshed in the legal
system in the two most critical areas of their
lives, home and work. Economic problems such
as wage claims, small loans, personal injuries,
and other money matters led the list. The next
major source of difficulty was the family. Problems between husband and wife headed the list,
followed by illegitimacy, juvenile matters, and
adoption. Landlord-tenant problems, recovery of
personal property, and descendants' estates made
up the bulk of property-related cases. Finally,
aid was sought in a wide variety of issues stretching from advice to the drawing of legal instruments. This order of priority remained constant
through the Society's first twenty-five years, and
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paralleled the casework of other organizations. " '
Though these matters were of extreme urgency to
their clients, they fell into numbingly routine
categories of legal practice.
To meet the problems within the limits imposed by its resources, the Society created a new
method of legal representation. First, it decided
whom it would represent. Legal aid in Boston
offered its services to a particular portion of the
city's poor. They were not, its publications continually pointed out, the dregs of Boston's wards.
Its clients were not "deadbeats, derelicts, fools,
and ne'er-do-wells," but rather impoverished
men and women, who through chicanery, malice,
or their own ignorance and misfortune had fallen
victim to one of the ills of urban life. They were,
as Smith phrased it, "self-respecting, self-supporting persons. As nearly as one group can they
represent the common people."' The Society was
able to select this segment of the poor because
it created an elaborate screening process designed
to detect the "meritorious poor."'"
The Society's screening process had three
major elements: eligibility standards, case restrictions, and fees. While the decision to limit its
clientele grew out of its staggering caseload, the
moral and professional obligations of the legal
aid lawyers determined how they would be imposed.
Clients first had to establish that they were
eligible for legal assistance. The economic condition of each applicant was ascertained through
a detailed examination designed to ensure that
the individual could not obtain private counsel
without sacrifice and hardship. The object was
to accept only those truly in need and to avoid
competition with the bar, the latter taking prece-

Highest Pilces Paid
for
Gold and Silver Coins
o Estate Appraisals
* Coins sold at public auction
* New England's largest full
service rare coin
dealership
NEW
Call 227-8800,
or visit us at
ENGLAND
89 Devonshire St.

(at the corner of
Water St.) in

downtown Boston

RARE COIN

GALLERIES
TME IIA

IN

AMIRKAN NiMI

,t4TKN

dence." Potential clients not only had to convince the Society that they were deserving, but
also that their claims were meritorious. Those
determined to be founded in revenge, personal
embellishment, spite or other ill-conceived motives, even if technically legal, were rejected."'
In addition to cases refused on these grounds
and those turned away because they either had
no legal merit or failed to fit traditional legal
categories, the Society's most significant taboos
were on initiating divorces and defending criminal complaints."
The Society's stance on
divorce reveals how closely its moral and
professional duties were intertwined. It had a
self-acknowledged commitment to maintaining
the integrity of the family. Defendants in divorce
proceedings were accepted so that the home
would be broken only after a full contest and
not for lack of representation. Refusal to initiate
a divorce was legal aid's contribution to the
"strong public policy against making divorce
easy and cheap."" With non-support and separation proceedings available, the issue was between
"legal action which breaks up the home and
legal action which preserves the home and leaves
the path open for reconciliation."

2

The Society

handled separations - the "poor man's divorce"
- but refused to sanction divorce. The only right
that the poor lost was that of remarriage, and it
seemed to one of the "Society's counsel that remarriage was a luxury that the woman or her
intended husband might reasonably be required
to pay for."'" The legal aid movement believed,
like most reform movements of the era, that the
family was the foundation of American society
and that divorce threatened its existence. Restrictions on divorce reflected the clear priority the
movement placed on its conception of society's
needs over the particular domestic troubles of its
clients.

44

The final hurdle in the selection process was
a fee system. Those too impoverished were exempted from payment. The rest were charged

retaining fees of 500 to $1 and 10% commission
on awards. Fees were supported for a number
of reasons: as a sign of the client's good faith, as
a means of eliminating unworthy cases, as a
rationale for examining applicants' financial affairs, and as a supplemental source of income."
Most importantly they put the Society's lawyerclient relationship nearer to its ideal of the selfrespecting, businesslike conduct of other law
offices. The legal aid lawyers also shared the fears
of other urban reformers that failure to charge
fees would pauperize their clients by leading
them to think that necessary services would always be provided without cost or sacrifice, thus
lowering their incentive to raise their economic
and social status.'"
The Society's fee system, which was followed
by most private legal aid organizations, provoked heated disagreement at the 1916 legal aid
convention. This dispute exposed the rift within
the movement between lawyers and social workers. Opponents of fees charged that they compelled legal aid to follow the conventional practices of private attorneys too closely and risked
sacrificing the basic ideal of rendering legal assistance to the poor. Others more pointedly questioned whether fees perpetuated the belief that
legal rights should be paid for and protected the
bar's privileged position within the legal system." Maud Boyes of the Chicago Protective
Agency for Women and Children voiced this opposition by declaring, "We surely believe that
justice should not be a purchasable commodity,
but a right."4 Smith responded to these complaints with a stout defense of the privately paid
attorney in the Anglo-American legal system. He
argued that legal aid should not be used to undermine the lawyer's role. "I think," he summarized, "that under our present system, the
way we are brought-up, the way we act and feel
and live and work, we will be compelled to pay
as we go, and that too seems to me to be the
helpful thing for us all."4
Unique Advocates
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each aspect of a case from all sides before accepting it. Their aim, a movement leader declared,
was "to have the right side of a controversy, to
eschew the standpoint of the partisan and approach more nearly that of the impartial judge."5 °
The gulf between this notion of the lawyer's
role and the prevailing one vividly surfaced during the battle over Louis Brandeis' nomination
to the United States Supreme Court. Austen Fox,
a leading corporate lawyer, explained his opposition by asserting, "The trouble with Mr. Brandeis is that he never loses his judicial attitude toward his clients. He always acts the part of a
judge instead of being his client's advocate, which
is against the practices of the bar."'" There were
no objections when legal aid attorneys assumed
this role.
The Society strayed from client advocacy because it perceived ;ts lawyers not as mere counselors but also as teachers, who explained the
functions and merits of the law to the poor. As
one of its presidents stated, "It is our ambition
not only to try and get justice for our people,
but also to try and show our clients where they
have been wrong or unreasonable.15 2 If a case

was accepted a legal aid lawyer strove to work
out an equitable solution for all concerned parties
and not drive the hardest bargain for his client.
In suits the Society attempted to "bring about a
real understanding between people who are in
the midst of a controversy with one another and
established a lasting peace which is worth as
much as all the money involved."5 3 Whether its
clients took such a sanguine view of their funds
is debatable, but they had little say in the matter.
Under the Society the individualistic justice of
the common law was minimized, the mainte4
nance of public order was emphasized.

The effect of these preferences was evident in
the disposition of cases brought by poor Bostonians to the Society. In one hundred cases drawn
from a typical year, 10% were rejected outright
because they violated one of the Society's restrictions; 6% were referred to a private attorney or
charity; 30% were terminated because the client
had either withdrawn the case or lost interest in
it or because he could not advance court costs;
29% were resolved solely through consultations:
and 19% were completed without court action
through setlements, the drawing of documents, or
the like. In the remaining 7% the Society went
to court, where it won the vast majority of its
litigation. Thus the Society successfully concluded a little over half of the complaints brought
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to it. These characteristics matched those of
other legal aid efforts.5
The Society added one final duty to its newly
created role of legal aid lawyer: that of the social
scientist. It was committed to eliminating defects
in the legal machinery by modernizing it to fit
contemporary needs, and embarked on a broad
reform campaign to achieve this goal. In a 1916
speech Smith singled out the three weapons of
the effort: appeals, remedial legislation, and public education."'
This reform drive was based on the notion that
trained technicians could cure social problems
by arriving at solutions whose appropriateness
was guaranteed by the neutrality of scientific
procedures. The task of legal aid lawyers was
to empirically diagnose and then expertly attack
the areas where poverty impinged on the legal
process. Legal aid was likened to a "laboratory
and its files to the test tubes in which our laws
are tested.""7 By parleying its expertise into an
attack on the legal surroundings of poverty, the
Society attempted to remove the structural defects that Smith had documented in Justice and
the Poor. Its clients spoke only through their
cases, which the legal aid attorneys filtered and
analyzed.
Appeals were the Society's first avenue of reform. These were opposed by some of the directors and shunned by several other organizations
because of their cost and the inordinate time
they took from the already heavy caseload. 8 But
such a position would have directly contradicted
the Society's claim of securing equal legal services for the poor. Moreover, through appeals
the poor gained entry into the nation's system of
judicial lawmaking. They had been excluded for
want of counsel, Smith and others contended,
thus stunting proper representative development
in the common law. Legal aid removed this
omission by opening up the chambers of higher
courts to the poor. The mere presence of cases
on workmen's compensation or seamen's rights,
they confidently predicted, would enable the common law to reflect the entire citizenry." Smith's
comments on the appellate process epitomized the
solid belief in the equity of the legal order on
which the Society rested. "It is not," he stated,
"of chief interest whether the legal aid organizations win or lose their appeals; the prime consideration is that our common law system should
have a fair chance to work itself out by having
those issues fairly argued, not from one but from
both points of view. '' O

The Society's refusal to scrap appeals because
of their financial cost also reveals the manner
in which legal aid lawyers separated the facts of
urban poverty from the legal issues they raised.
They scrupulously avoided litigation about the
daily problems in the lives of the poor that
erupted into practical disputes. Their training
and social cohesion deterred them from litigating
such suits in the lower courts. But appeals were
a different matter. They allowed legal aid lawyers
a chance to argue about theoretical issues and
broader legal affairs. At this level litigation not
only established new common law doctrines,
but it enhanced the lawyers' standing within the
legal community
Remedial legislation was the second phase of
the Society's reform campaign. This was a direct
attempt to utilize its expertise to adapt legal institutions to the needs of the urban poor." Legislative reform moved on two fronts. Gaining access to the courts for the poor was the first, a
wide variety of particular remedial acts the second. During its first twenty-five years, the Society, independently or in conjunction with various philanthropic groups and legislators, secured
passage of a number of state and city measures
in both of these areas.
The Society moved against the three areas
Smith had targeted for judicial reform in Justice
and the Poor: delay, court costs, and antiquated
tribunals. Its most conspicuous success was Massachusetts' adoption of the first statewide system of small claims courts."2 These were the keystones in the Society's plan to create a system of
conciliatory dispute settling institutions for resolving the legal complaints of those unable to
afford the established process."3 Its call for other
changes such as the elimination of two trials of
fact, unification of court organization, and lower
court costs gained less immediate results. But
Smith, as chairman of the A.B.A.'s legal aid
committee, helped draft a model poor litigant's
statute designed to promote national adoption of

such procedural reforms. Proclaimed at its 1925
unveiling as a total solution to the problems of
justice and poverty, the statute was a compendium of the reforms advocated in Justice and the
Poor and pursued by the Society. It also paralleled attempts by others in the uniform statute
movement to impose standardized solutions on
national legal problems, 4
The Society was more successful on its second
legislative front. It secured the enactment of a
number of statutes de,3igned to relieve specific
problems. These included stringent rules to compel delinquent fathers to support their offsping,
safeguards for employees under workmen's compensation proceedings, reinforcement of tenants'
rights in eviction, and state regulation of small
loans." ' Both area,, illustrate the Society's conception of the deficiencies within the legal system
it was empowered to eliminate as the city's selfappointed expert on poverty and the law.
The Society's final reform measure was an attempt to win the public over to its views of the
poor. It sought to educate Bostonians as to how
to manage poverty in a complex society without
sacrificing the society's basic assumptions and
institutions. In its public appeals for support and
funds, the Society publicized the evils it fought,
while extolling the system it defended. It pictured its members not as visionary reformers but
as dedicated experts solving critical social problems and as frontline troops in the battle to preserve the American way of life."" In Boston and
other cities, legal aid organizations raised the
specter of rampant bolshevism, class warfare,
and anarchy if the legal demands of the poor
were not placated. Smith underscored the severity of the threat by addressing the general fear
of social disorder. He warned, "When a man has
been wronged, the only redress allowed him in a
civilized society is court action. If for any reason he is denied his day in court - whether it
results from delays or court costs or inability to
engage counsel - society has made an implacable foe.""'
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A Model Client
A fictional fundraising pamphlet published by
the Society in 1923, "Luigi and the Law's Delay," presented the city the legal aid lawyer's
notion of the ideal client, case, and resolution.
Luigi, an Italian immigrant, was being tormented

LUIGI

and the
LAW'S DELAY
CIA JA03J

YT 13OS

tion, while his wife prayed. From there he was
sent to a downtown lawyer, who received him
with an "irritating calm and lack of interest,"
asked some questions, and then sent him to the
Society. After a short wait, a staff attorney
listened to him sympathetically and told him to
wait while he investigated the matter. Watching
the clock Luigi realized that his time was up and
leaped up in distress: "with the emotional swiftness of his race (apathy) was succeeded by rebellion - open, flaming rebellion. Back in Florence they met the law's delay in a fashion
distinctly their own." Pacified by the receptionist, he was unaware that the attorney had confronted the dealer, found that a valid contract
had not been made, and discovered that many
of Luigi's payments had not been credited. Rectifying the situation, he hastened back to the
office,
where that emotional facility of Luigi's quickly
swept from the red pit of anarchy to the cooler
level of restored confidence. He listened in
amazement . . . as the simple solution was

The 1923 fictional story of the legal problems of a
poor Italian immigrant, "Luigi and the Law's Delay,"
was published by the Boston Legal Aid Society to
raise funds. It presented a dramatic model of legal
aid work.
by a furniture dealer, "none too scrupulous in
observing the law," who demanded payment for
a set of furniture within an hour under the threat
of repossession. Ignorant of "American habits
and customs, let alone American law," unable to
speak English, but convinced that an injustice
was being perpetrated, Luigi was "certainly an
incipient anarchist." Taking the hour demand
literally, he hurried to the Bureau of Immigra-
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unfolded to him. .. The fee? Fifty cents. For
Luigi, the literal, as in the nature of things,
was reserved for that expansive happiness
which the insignificant often provides for their
kind; for the staff attorney, philosophic contemplation and the next case."'
The story highlighted in dramatic form the features sought by the Society in its work. These
were the presence of economic distress but not
abject poverty, a clearly defined legal problem, a
worthy interest in its solution, and a speedy resolution that not only relieved the immediate difficulty but also educated the client in the proper
functioning of the law and thereby won his acceptance of it.
In an era of acute social unrest, legal aid's approach to the complaints of the poor had obvious
appeal. Especially compelling was the Society's
assurance that its services created a "profound
respect for the law and an abiding faith in America.""' Steadily rising subscriptions and voices of
support reflected the Society's success in convincing Bostonians that it was the only socially palatable legal resource open to the poor, and that
it was helping to preserve, as Governor Calvin
Coolidge put it, "law and order."" °
Freed from the constraints of normal practice,
but weighted down by the tremendous demand it
unleashed, the Society tackled its caseload with
a new type of legal organization. It combined
representation with socialization and instru-

mental reform. In the process it laid the foundation for a formal division within the urban legal
process. The poor, and the middle classes, were
offered legal remedies like legal aid and small
claims courts that stressed harmonious legal relations based on peaceful, informal settlements.
Wealthy citizens continued to use the combative
legal resources of common law advocacy. In this
way the Society pressed its own moral, philanthropic, and professional goals of order, rationality, and community on its clients. These were
the terms that poor Bostonians wrenched from
the legal aid movement in return for counsel and
entrance to legal institutions. All they sacrificed
was the right to have any and all legal claims
argued to the fullest possible extent. To the Society this was not only a fair but a beneficial exchange.
A Mixed Legacy
The record of the Boston Legal Aid Society
illustrates the three main achievements of the
initial phase of American legal aid: (1) recognition that poverty effectively barred large segments of the citizenry from legal institutions,
(2) persuasion of significant portions of the legal
profession and the laity that the legal system
should be open to the indigent, and (3) creation
of broad programs that sought to equalize entry
into the urban legal system. Through the movement legal services for the poor became an urban
fixture and an accepted element of the bar's
modern professional structure. But the movement's optimistic hope that it could end the effects of poverty on the legal process proved unfounded. Instead of disappearing, the legal
ailments of the poor festered and grew.
Legal aid was stymied by the conflicting commitments of its supporters. These led to limited
and often inconsistent perceptions of the problems that confronted the poor and the techniques
needed to overcome them. Linked to the legal
profession, the philanthropies, and the urban
legal institutions, the private legal aid organizations occupied an ambiguous middle ground.
Legal aid under them was at once a public responsibility, a professional obligation, and a
philanthropic concern. These three roles were
combined into ain uneasy alliance that attempted
to satisfy the poor's swelling legal demands, the
bar's ethical and professionalizing goals, and the
charities' aim of placating and assimilating the
native and immigrant lower classes. Such a
stance ensured that legal aid would offer inex-

pensive legal services without challenging the
existing social structure.
Also debilitating was organized legal aid's assertion that the legal problems of poverty were
mainly caused by institutional defects which shut
the poor out of the legal process. Lacking a comprehensive theory of urban poverty, legal aid
lawyers refused to recognize the complex web
of political, economic, and social circumstances
facing poor urbanites, of which legal problems
were only one manifestation. Instead they relied on a procedural definition which equated
equal justice with individual access to legal institutions. Legal aid lawyers expanded the counselor
role to enable them to use their expertise to open
the process to individual complaints not to press
for special initiatives for the poor as a class. Accepting as essentially just and equitable both the
institutions and methods of the legal order, they
saw the need for only procedural reforms, the
usual lawyerly proposal for improvement. But
access to courts and counsel was a hollow opportunity that could not remove the other effects
of poverty impinging on the administration of
the law."'

The legal aid lawyer's conception of legal services for the poor had serious consequences for
their clientele. Financial limitations united with
restrictive policies to cripple their assistance.
Though caseloads rose annually, legal aid in Boston and nationally met but one third to one half
of even the recognized need 12 And despite their
intention to treat their clients like those of any
other law office, legal aid lawyers viewed the
poor man as "a welfare client rather than as a
citizen capable of having rights and duties and
knowing his own best interests.""3 Through the
legal aid societies the legal prerogatives of the
poor were privileges dependent on professional
generosity, not public guaranteees.
Like so many other progressive solutions, legal
aid lingered on after the excitement of progressivism had died. Once the upheavals of the early
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twentieth century faded, the private societies
continued to do their work and to maintain a
rigid faith in the movement's concepts, but they
lost their reforming zeal and vital social links
as the nation moved on to new ideas and causes.
In the early 1950's Raynor Gardiner, general
counsel of the Boston Society since 1926,
mourned for a movement that had lost its rele-

vancy. He lamented that the highly qualified
legal aid lawyers were viewed as eccentrics and
not taken "very seriously by members of the

11 Boston Legal Aid Society, Annual Report, 18
(1917-18), 27.
'. Smith, Justice and the Poor,227.
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05), 14-15.
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"Character of Litigation to be Undertaken," Report
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